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the way the doctor makes the presentation ordinaril y tells the tale. Arney also 
noted, "The NIH 'consensus-developing' T ask Force on Predictors of Hereditary 
Disease or Congenital Defects recommended against requiring prior commitment 
to abortion , but there is no m echanism for enforcing their recommendation." He 
also noted, quite accurately, that "the incidence of severe depression follow ing 
elective abort ion for genetic reasons is so great" that "it may be more difficult to 
deal with than either an abortion of 'convenience' or a stillbirth at term," or 
perhaps "even more difficult than bearing and rearing a defective child." Arney 
does an excellen t job in summing up the implicit agreement m ade between 
modern obstetric ians and modern women. He writes, " The rule, simply stated, is 
that birth should occur withi n a flexible system of obstetrical alternatives in 
which a woman's experiences can take prominence against a background of 
obstetrical expertise and safety. Around this rule modern women and modern 
obstetricians have begun a univocal discourse over childbirth . They are ostensibly 
engaged in a dialogue , but in the exchanges o nl y a single voice is h eard." Unfor-
tunately, in living o u t this agreement, the patient and this doctor occasionally end 
up in an adversary relationship. The au thor, by way of conclusion, gives a very 
positive and accurate presentation of the benefit to both m other and baby of a 
prepared childbirth (psychoprophylaxis) approach to delivery. 
The reviewer was , perhaps, prejudiced from the start against the book. It is 
written in the language of the intellectually elite. Like ecclesiastic langu age, it can 
be difficult to read. It is discomforting to be driven to the dictionary to under-
stand the meaning of a passage, especially when the thought can be simply 
expressed. Who needs to say "concatenation " when " linking together" says it all . 
The reviewer would not pay the $25 price listed for this publication. 
- William F. Colliton, Jr ., M.D . 
Chairman, Department of OB/GYN 
Holy Cross Hospital 
Silver Spring, Maryland 
A Theory 0/ Medical Ethics 
Robert M. Veatch 
Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1981, xi + 387 pp., index. 
This is undoubtedly an important book in medical ethics , both for moralists 
working in bioethics and for those in the h ealth care professions. If only because 
of the stature of its author, it is bound to be influen t ial, and with good reaso n. 
For Veatch is a balanced and thorough writer whose reputation in the field of 
bioethics is largely deserved. Moreover, the book's topic is important and the 
project it represents is ambitious ; it is nothing less than an attempt to articulate an 
ethics for the medical professions fro m the ground up. Veatch seeks to articulate a 
public ethics which will really provide guidance for the difficult decisions health 
care professionals and others must make in the modern health care setting. Fur-
thermore , the ra nge of topics discussed and Veatch 's device of focusing discus-
sions by way of concrete bioethical dilemmas make the book valuable no matter 
what one thinks of the success of Veatch 's project. 
In the first of the four parts of the book, Veatch surveys various traditions of 
m edical and physician ethics. He discusses the Hippocratic and Judeo-Christian 
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tradit ions, modern secular medical ethics, and a variety of traditions outside the 
Anglo-American West . The diversity of moral judgment among these traditions 
and their inadequacy to provide clear guidance on the test case Veatch uses are 
intended to show the need for a new medical ethics. The case is one in which a 
woman, about to die and the sole support of her infant who suffered from a 
malformed hip, asked for help from her physician in painlessly killing her child 
- a course of action she regarded as the most loving thing to do in the circum-
stances. However, as Veatch himself admits, most of the traditions he considers 
would regard this killing as seriously wrong - for different reasons, perhaps, and 
not without straining or inconsistency on the part of some. So this example does 
not serve Veatch's purpose as well as some other example might. Still, he shows 
clearly enough that there are real differences and disagreements among the various 
established traditions of medical ethics, and thus a need for work on the founda -
tions of medical ethics. 
The second part of the book contains Veatch's attempt to articulate a universal 
foundation for medical ethics. This part of .the book has two sections: a 
polemical, and a constructive. In the polemical section, he mounts a powerful 
critique of the idea that medical ethics can be founded on professional ethics of 
physicians. One reason for the inadequacy of such a foundation is the fact that 
the questions of medical ethics are not simply questions for physicians but for 
other h ealth care professionals, patients, arid for people in general. There is no 
reason why the specialized knowledge or moral convictions unique to a profession 
should have any moral force for these people - much less the mere fact that the 
profession has reached a consensus on moral matters. 
The constructive alternative proposed by Veatch is a complicated version of a 
social contract approach to ethical theory. The appropriateness of this approach is 
suggested by the social and contractual nature of m edicine itself. Veatch 's theory 
involves a threefold contract. The first is the basic contract which establishes 
society and its morality. The second is the contract between the medical profes-
sions and society. The third is the contract between the health care professional 
and the patient. What the parties to these three contracts accept will be the set of 
moral principles for m edical ethics. 
Veatch notes that for some the contract is an epistemological device for dis-
covering moral truth, but that for others it is a way of inventing a morality. He 
thinks that this basic disagreement can be set aside, for if those who regard the 
basic contract as a means for inventing a morality which serves tbe ir self-interest 
are willing to take the moral point of view, the results of this approach will be the 
same as when it is used by those who regard it as a way of discovering moral 
truths which are somehow given. I think that Veatch 's judgment that this disagree-
ment need not be settled is the basic mistake in his project , for it belies a willing-
ness to sacrifice moral truth to the requirements of reaching a workable agree-
ment. And the two conceptions of the role of the basic contract are not likely to 
give the same results. For self-interest, conditioned only by the impartiality of the 
moral point of view, will provide for some limits on the social behavior of individ-
uals and groups but not a limit that will significantly compromise self-interest. It 
is true that any functioning group needs some morality and this involves some 
appeal to impartiality, but if self-interest is the basic principle, . then the morality 
developed will limit the range of the application of the principle of impartiality, 
so as not to overly constrain the basic concern of self-interest. Only if impartiality 
is taken as basic will the self-interest of the contractors be systematically con-
strained. But then, it seems to me, self-interest would no longer be basic; we 
would have, instead, a morality based on at least one moral truth. 
This objection is not a merely theoretical quibble, for it goes to the heart of 
what Veatch is undertaking. He wants a medical ethics which is both rationally 
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based and practically workable - something on which people can agree. But by 
setting up the conditions of the contract as h e does, Veatch allows the desire for 
agreement to override the requirement for a sound moral basis. Thus, when in the 
next part of the book Veatch seeks to articulate p rinciples, the self-interest of 
some contractors is allowed to override other moral convictions, with the result 
that the principles agreed to are sometimes so general that they provide no real 
moral guidance. They are compromises which may satisfy those who want a moral 
framework within which to pursue their self-interest but hardly those who regard 
more stringent norms to be a matter of moral truth. 
This is not to say that Veatch 's attempt to develop principles in th e third 
section of the book is without merit. Much of what he says there is helpful and, it 
seems to me, correct. He develops principles of contract-keeping, autonomy, 
honesty, avoiding killing, and justice. He deve lops these principles after showing 
that the Hippocratic principle of beneficence and its modern utilitarian replace-
ment cannot serve as principles of medical ethics. These criticisms are powerful 
and do not depend on what self-interested contractors might or might not accept. 
Rather, the critique is based on the reasons contractors might have fo r rejecting 
these positions - reasons based entirely on philosophical analysis. 
The difficulty in this third part of the book comes to the fore in the discussion 
of the principle of avoiding killing. Veatch favors a very strong prohibition of 
killing but recognizes that most would not accept it. He also criticizes, unper-
suasively in my opinion, the double effect doctrine which provides reasonable 
limits for the prohibition of killing. Thus, he leaves unsettled the basic moral 
question of mercy killing which, he says, is as reasonable an exception as there 
might be to the prohibition against killing. Nevertheless, Veatch holds that medi-
cal professionals, because of their particular role, should not engage in it. In 
discussing the definition of death , he allows that the policy of regarding as dead 
only those who have suffered complete destruc tion of brain function is merely 
pragmatic and that moral standing should rather be determined by the capacity 
for some sort of mental or social activity. On abortion, he simply declares that the 
fetus lacks moral standing. 
In short, the general pro-life principle Veatch embraces in fact has no cutting 
edge. Since it seems that there is little prospect in the present situation for 
reaching any meaningful consensus on the life issues, the very general and tenta-
tive things V-eatch has to say on this provide no real guidance. It seems to me, 
therefore, that in· this area one should not try to achieve a non-existent neutrality, 
but rather make one's arguments as best one can, giving the best moral reasons 
one has for what one thinks is truly right. 
In the last part of the book, Veatch deals with the question of how to apply 
the various principles to actual cases - especially cases in .which the principles 
conflict. The problem he faces is the problem of any ethical system with a plural-
ity of independent principles. This problem, it seems to me, is rationally insoluble. 
It requires either an overriding principle for ordering the application of the sub-
stantive principles, or the use of intuition, decision, or some other non-rational 
basis to decide which principle takes priority. It is not clear which of these 
alternatives Veatch accepts , or even that he clearly faces the issue. What he does 
say is that there is no general ordering principle except the requirement that the 
principle of beneficence should give way to the other non-consequentialist prin-
ciples he states, and that m ore specific m oral rules should be taken seriously but 
not absolutely. However, the rules are derived from the principles and, like the 
principles, are not tightly hierarchized. If there is an indexical order in the rules 
- which there must be if they are to solve the problem - then one wonders what 
its source might be. It cannot be the principles for they are not ordered. So is it 
intuition, practice, o r decision, whether individual or group? If it is, we may ask 
what is rational about these things. 
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This line of criticism is not meant to suggest that concrete decisions in medical 
ethics are easily made. The problem is that we seem to have no articulable process 
for rationally reaching them within the framework Veatch establishes. And w ith-
out such a process there is not, in principle, a way of arriving at a reasoned 
consensus about the specific issues in medical ethics. Without the possibility of 
such agreement, it is hard to see the value of agreement about general principles. 
To resolve this difficulty, one must have a single basic principle, like the love 
command of Christian ethics, or the principle of utility, or the Kantian principle 
of respect for persons. Veatch correctly rejects the principle of utility, but does 
not closely consider the other alternatives, perhaps because of the ambiguity of 
the status of his contractors. Self-interested contractors would not accept either 
the Christian or the Kantian principle. But this refusal shows only that the 
demands of an agreeable conventional morality do not necessarily coincide with 
the logical demands of a moral system which is based on moral truth and seeks to 
give real guidance for difficult choices. 
In short, this is an important and useful book, but it founders on the rocky 
shoals of ethical theory because the author did no.t think hard enough about the 
demands of the difficult task he undertook. 
- Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. 
University of St. Thomas 
Houston, Texas 
TWO VIEWS ON: 
Moral Responsibility 
in Pro I onging Life Decisions 
Donald G. McCarthy and Albert S. Moraczewski, Editors 
Pope John Center, St. Louis, 1981, xii + 316 pp. , $9.95. 
I 
The genesis of this work arose from papers prepared for three institutes for 
health care professionals which were co-sponsored by the Catholic Health Associa-
tion and the Pope John Medical-Moral Research and Education Center of St. 
Louis. The volume is designed as an intra-Church project , has the Nihil Obstat and 
Imprimatur, and carries out the mission of the Center namely, "applying Church 
teaching to contemporary medical-moral issues. " This paradigm, ironically, con-
tributes to both the strength and weaknesses of the work. 
The book is divided into three sections. There are four essays on "Life and 
Death"; eight on "Prolonging Life Decisions"; and the editors are completely 
responsible for the final eight chapters on "Clinical and Pastoral Applications." 
The contributors represent the disciplines of theology, biblical studies, philos-
ophy, law, sociology and medicine. 
In general, the essays are critical of contemporary ethical trends, for most 
respondents speak out of a natural law, deontological framework. 
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